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Abstract 
The cun'ent research examined whether mock jurors make differential 
assessments of guilt of defendants based on inclusion or exclusion of confession 
evidence and type of coercion to determine if jurors' behavioral reactions to 
confession evidence could be predicted. Hypotheses addressed effects of various 
factors on jurors' decisions of verdicts regarding defendants' guilt or innocence 
and their certainty of these verdicts: inclusion of confession evidence, type of 
coercion used in obtaining confessions, admissible or inadmissible presentation of 
confession evidence, and influence of potential predictor variables. Predictor 
variables assessed included participants' Belief in a Just World, Spheres of 
Control, New Authoritarianism, and Belief in False Confession Evidence. No 
main effects were found for participants' first or second verdicts or certainty 
assessments. 
Confession, Coercion, Procedural Error and the Juror 
Introduction 
Fear of crime and victimization underlie criminological thought and 
resulting policies (Stanko, 2001). In an attempt to contain this fear of 
victimization to manageable levels, officers of the court are charged with 
apprehending those who deviate from established rules of law in order to maintain 
an appearance of safety for those who obey these rules. People who are correctly 
accused of violations of the law are generally expected to accept responsibility 
and to express remorse by publicly confessing their crimes. Contrarily, those 
accused who are innocent are expected to continually and consistently protest 
their innocence. The desire of the American public for closure through the 
confession of guilt was demonstrated during the months prior to the execution of 
Timothy McVeigh. Despite the failure of federal prosecutors to disclose records 
pertaining to the investigation to McVeigh's lawyers, the U. S. Attorney General 
and the federal judge in the case argued McVeigh's out-of-court confession 
proved his guilt and negated any need for an appeal of his death sentence 
("McVeigh asks for stay," 2001; "McVeigh denied stay," 2001). On the day of 
his execution, survivors and family members of victims of the Oklahoma City 
bombing gathered to watch McVeigh's execution in person and on closed circuit 
video in hopes of hearing an expression of apology or remorse, but many were 
surprised and some inconsolable when McVeigh made no such statement ("No 
apology," 2001). As exemplified in the McVeigh case, justice appears to be 
Confession Coercion 2 
served in American culture through the confession of one's transgressions and 
subsequent expressions of remorse. Following this line of thought, it is not. 
surprising that research has found suspects who offered incriminating confession 
evidence while being interrogated were believed to be guilty, were more likely to 
be charged, convicted, and sentenced for longer and more severe sentences, and 
were less likely to have their cases dismissed (Leo, 1996). People who confess 
are assumed to do so because they are guilty; however, this is not necessarily 
always the case. The current research was designed to determine if it is true that 
mock jurors would tend to assume that defendants were guilty when defendants' 
confessions were entered into evidence and, if so, whether the type of coercion 
used in eliciting these confessions would influence their opinions. 
Reasons For and Legitimacy of Confessions 
Individuals confess to crimes for numerous reasons, but not all of these 
confessions are truthful (Gudjonsson, 1992; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). 
Individuals may voluntarily confess to crimes of which they are actually guilty to 
engage in plea-bargaining, to obtain leniency, or to express remorse. 
Alternatively, others may issue one of three types of false confessions identified 
in the literature: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalized (Kassin 
& Wrightsman, 1985). Those who confess to crimes that they did not commit, to 
gain notoriety or to express generalized guilt, are described as issuing voluntary 
false confessions. These individuals are well aware oftheir innocence but often 
willingly confess in order to gain desired publicity or to protect someone close to 
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them. Some other people issue coerced-compliant false confessions in order to 
protect themselves from some perceived threat or to avoid other potentially 
serious charges or punishment. Like those who voluntarily confess falsely, 
individuals who make coerced-compliant confessions are aware of their 
innocence but appear to feel compelled to confess for crimes in order to avoid 
further interrogation or to accept some perceived reward for compliance to 
demands to confess. Still other innocent persons may make coerced-internalized 
false confessions after being interrogated because they come to believe in their 
own guilt. While considered to be the most rare of the three types of false 
confessions, those persons who make coerced-internalized false confessions were 
originally aware of their innocence but came to believe that they must have 
committed the crimes of which they were accused. These false beliefs developed 
during interrogation generally persist over time and across situations and are 
difficult to counteract. Given the varied reasons for offering confessions, if it is 
true that confessions are viewed as indicative of guilt by criminal justice officials 
and members of the American public, it is necessary to estimate the prevalence of 
both true and false confessions. It is important to determine whether innocent 
persons are being wrongfully charged for crimes based on confessions made in 
private or during interrogations. Furthermore, the influence of confession 
evidence on jurors' assessments of the guilt or innocence of individuals who have 
been charged and indicted must also be examined to control for wrongful 
convictions based on invalid confessions. 
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Researchers have estimated that confessions are entered into evidence in 
roughly 42% to 76% of criminal trials and are implicated in many more cases 
adjudicated through plea-bargaining (Gudjonsson, 1992; Wrightsman & Kassin, 
1993). The number ofthese confessions that are true or false, however, is hotly 
debated in the literature; difficulties become apparent when attempting to 
quantitatively separate these types. For instance, research methods used in 
gathering what constitutes a false versus a true confession are inconsistent across 
studies. In one such study, estimates of false confessions were gathered from 
incarcerated inmates using a self-report survey (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1994). 
Of the 229 inmates who responded to the survey, 27, or 12%, reported making 
false confessions during interrogations; of these, 21 (78%) were convicted ofthe 
related offenses. Most of the reported false confessions were for property, traffic, 
or drug offenses, and approximately half resulted from inducements by police 
officers or attempts to protect others. Other researchers used anecdotal polling to 
obtain estimates of wrongful convictions from defense attorneys, prosecutors, and 
court officials from Ohio (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996). Of the 353 
questionnaires mailed, 229 (65%) of the respondents reported that 0.5% ofthe 
"convictions" in the United States for the eight index crimes reported in the FBI's 
Uniform Crime Reports in 1993 (of which arrests were 2,848,400) were wrongful 
convictions, and approximately 394 of these per year were estimated to be 
attributable to the presentation of coerced confession evidence. However, these 
findings were challenged in a subsequent study as being based on an 
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overestimation of actual convictions because cases adjudicated with pleas were 
included in the sample (Cassell, 1998). After readjusting for cases that were plea-
bargained as guilty, Cassell estimated approximately 1 in 93,000 convictions per 
year (0.001 %) resulted in wrongful convictions based on false confession 
evidence. Given these disparate findings, it appears that the actual incidence of 
false confessions is still very much up in the air. 
Legitimacy of Confessions 
Court and criminal justice officials attempt to verify the legitimacy and 
admissibility of disputed confession evidence prior to its presentation to juries 
(Kassin, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). 
Judges meet with attorneys for the state and defense, arresting officers, and 
defendants in pretrial hearings to determine whether defendants' confessions 
should be considered voluntary and therefore admissible in court. In Columbe v. 
Connecticut (1961), the U. S. Supreme Court established criteria by which the 
voluntary nature of an alleged confession should be determined. Justice 
Frankfurter (p. 2), who was joined by Justice Stewart, announced the holding for 
the Court: 
No single test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation by state law 
enforcement officers in obtaining confessions exists, neither extensive 
cross questioning, nor undue delay in arraignment, nor failure to caution a 
prisoner, nor refusal to permit communication with friends and legal 
counsel at stages in the proceeding when the prisoner is still only a 
suspect; each of these factors, in company with all of the surrounding 
circumstances -- the duration and conditions of detention, the manifest 
attitude of the police toward him, his physical and mental state, the diverse 
pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control --
is relevant, the ultimate test being voluntariness of the confession. 
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In order to assess voluntariness in pretrial hearings, arresting officers read typed, 
signed confessions made by defendants to judges, answer related questions on 
behalf of defendants, confirm defendants were informed of their Miranda rights, 
and verify interrogation procedures were followed when confessions were given. 
Judges then find the confessions as voluntary or involuntary based on the criteria 
outlined above, and the confessions are then respectively entered into testimony 
or excluded from evidence in subsequent trials. 
In addition to the voluntariness criteria, the U. S. Supreme Court set 
guidelines for the admissibility of confession evidence in its landmark Miranda 
ruling (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). The ruling 
stipulated that suspects must be informed of their rights against self-incrimination 
and to have the presence of counsel during interrogations. After being informed 
of these rights, suspects should have the expectation that questioning would be 
halted until their attorneys' arrivals if they exercised these rights. However, in an 
observational study of 122 interrogations, Leo (1996) found 78% of suspects who 
were being interviewed eventually waived their Miranda rights and were 
interrogated out of the presence of counsel, and significantly more of these 
suspects' cases were judged guilty through plea-bargaining than were cases of 
suspects who stopped their interrogations. Why would suspects place themselves 
in peril by waiving their rights and speaking to investigators without requesting 
access to attorneys? Some may confess for crimes of which they are guilty in 
order to express remorse or gain leniency in punishment and sentencing 
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(Gudjonsson, 1992). Others who are guilty may speak to investigators in order to 
challenge the investigators or serve their own egos. Still others may be innocent 
individuals who respond to investigators' comments such as, "If you're innocent, 
you don't need a lawyer, now, do you?" Regardless ofthe circumstances, once 
suspects waive their right to counsel, incriminating statements that they make can 
be used against them in trial. 
Concerns regarding the voluntary nature of suspects' confessions often 
stem from the routine use of certain interrogation tactics by police officers. In the 
quest for the truth, one of two authors of the most commonly used interrogative 
training manual, Fred Inbau (1991, p. 1400), asserted: 
Of necessity criminal interrogators must deal with criminal offenders on a 
somewhat lower moral plane than that upon which ethical, law-abiding 
citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs. That plane, in the 
interest of innocent suspects, need only be subject to the following 
restriction: although both 'fair' and 'unfair' interrogative practices are 
permissible, nothing shall be done or said to the subject that will be apt to 
make an innocent person confess. 
Examples ofthe "fair" and "unfair" tactics often employed in interrogations 
include convincing suspects that their situations are hopeless by distorting the 
significance of evidence, stirring suspects' emotions by describing the pain and 
suffering of victims, and heightening suspects' fears of punishment by stressing 
the advantages of speedy cooperation and confession (Of she, 1989). These and 
other interrogative techniques were characterized by Kassin and McNall (1991) as 
falling into one of two types. Maximization techniques are those with which an 
interrogator attempts to frighten or pressure a suspect into making a confession in 
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order to escape harsh punishment. One example of a maximization technique 
used by officers is refened to as a knowledge-bluff technique and involves telling 
suspects specific evidence such as a fingerprint exists that directly links these 
suspects to the alleged crime scenes. Another example involves the use of 
questions that bait suspects in order to make suspects become nervous and more 
likely to confess. In contrast, minimization techniques are those used by 
investigators to imply justification exists for the crimes of which they have been 
charged so that suspects might feel less responsible for their alleged actions and 
be more likely to confess in order to gain reduced punishment. Minimization 
techniques often involve the denigration of victims by blaming victims for 
instigating their own attacks or for failing to protect their assets. Officers 
sometimes pretend to sympathize with offenders by agreeing that they have 
known others who deserved to be treated similarly to the ways in which alleged 
victims were treated; this stance provides perceived justification for suspects' 
alleged confessions. 
Previous research examining decisions of mock jurors who were exposed 
to confessions elicited with positive or negative coercion revealed that jurors 
appeared to have assessed the voluntary nature of these confessions differentially. 
In a series of experiments evaluating jurors' verdicts and assessments of the 
likelihood of defendants' guilt, Wrightsman and Kassin (1993) consistently found 
that mock jurors tended to judge confessions elicited with positive coercive 
techniques, which implied opportunities for leniency, as more voluntary than 
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those elicited with negative coercion, which implied chances of more severe 
punishment for defendants. Additionally, defendants who made confessions 
when positive coercion was used were judged as more likely to have committed 
the crimes charged, and jurors tended to return guilty verdicts when encountering 
these scenarios. However, when these jurors perceived that direct threats had 
been implied through interrogators' uses of negative coercive techniques, jurors 
tended to discount the resultant confession evidence and found the defendants less 
likely to have committed the crimes. These findings are disconcerting because 
suspects often perceive that positive coercion, or minimization techniques, lessens 
their responsibility for their alleged acts and reduces their potential severity of 
punishments if they confessed quickly. In other words, suspects might be more 
likely to confess for these crimes because they expect lenient treatment but could 
instead be adjudicated guilty by jurors and sentenced more stringently by justice 
officials. 
The type of coercion implicated in eliciting the confession evidence was 
varied in the current research to evaluate whether jurors exposed to confession 
evidence make differential judgments of guilt based on the type of coercion used 
in interrogative techniques. Half ofthe experimental participants who 
encountered confession evidence read a scenario in which the confession was 
obtained with minimization techniques, or positive coercion. In these scenarios, 
detectives implied that the victim was responsible for her own victimization. The 
other half of the experimental participants read a scenario in which confession 
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evidence was obtained with maximization techniques, or negative coercion. In 
these scenarios, detectives specifically stated that the suspect had been caught on 
video with evidence from the crime scene. 
Often, confessions elicited with positive or negative coercion are deemed 
involuntary and inadmissible during pretrial hearings but are later alluded to in the 
presence of jurors during trial. In Arizona v. Fulminante, the U. S. Supreme 
Court found certain confession evidence that inadvertently comes to the attention 
of jurors can be considered "harmless error" if prosecutors can demonstrate that 
the inadmissible inclusion of this evidence does not influence the verdict in the 
respective trial (Arizona v. Fulminante, 1991; Kassin & Neumann, 1997; 
Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). The Court based their findings on two assumptions 
regarding juror behavior: 1) jurors were believed to be able to ignore confession 
evidence when instructed to do so by justice officials and 2) jurors were not 
thought to weigh confession evidence as more influential on their verdicts than 
other incriminating types of evidence. However, subsequent evaluations ofthese 
assumptions suggest they may be faulty. For example, in an evaluation of the 
abilities of jurors to ignore confession evidence when instructed to do so, jurors 
failed to disregard inadmissible evidence of an alleged confession and found the 
defendant guilty more than did controls although these jurors had rated the 
confession as negatively coerced and involuntarily made by the defendant (Kassin 
& Sukel, 1997). A separate study that examined the influence of confession 
evidence on jurors' verdicts found jurors rated defendants more deserving of 
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punishment if defendants had confessed rather than if they had claimed their Fifth 
Amendment rights or had denied the charges in efforts to protect themselves 
(Fischer & Fehr, 1985). Jurors also were found to evaluate confession evidence 
as more influential on their verdicts than eyewitness or character testimony 
(Kassin & Neumann, 1997). These findings raise doubts regarding jurors' ability 
to disregard inadmissible confession evidence and support the contention that 
jurors perceive defendants who confess as accepting responsibility and expressing 
remorse for the crimes of which they were charged. 
In other circumstances, alleged confession evidence that has been deemed 
inadmissible during pretrial hearings jnadvertently comes to the attention of jurors 
through the media either before or during the trial. For instance, in Mu' Min v. 
Virginia, the U. S. Supreme Court found that the defendant's Constitutional rights 
to an impartial jury and due process were not violated when the trial judge refused 
to question prospective jurors in voir dire regarding the specific content of 
extensive and inflammatory pretrial publicity to which they had been exposed 
(Mu' Min v. Virginia, 1991; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). Media coverage of the 
circumstances of the crime was extensive and included allegations that the 
defendant had brutally murdered the victim while on prison work detail and had 
confessed to doing so. Rather than questioning individual jurors regarding the 
content of pretrial publicity to which they had been exposed, the judge in the case 
determined it was sufficient to ask the group of potential jurors collectively if they 
had been exposed to publicity regarding the crime. The Supreme Court 
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subsequently agreed with this decision. A majority ofthe jurors who were chosen 
stated they had been exposed to publicity regarding the case but asserted that the 
stories had not caused them to make decisions regarding the suspects' guilt prior 
to the trial. The defendant was later found guilty and sentenced to death, and his 
sentence was upheld on appeal. 
Research findings examining the influence of pretrial pUblicity on jurors' 
verdicts have consistently challenged the view that jurors are able to disregard 
damaging information they encounter through the media prior to trials. A meta-
analytic review of 44 experiments with 5,755 participants that examined the 
effects of pretrial publicity on jurors' decisions found jurors who were exposed to 
damaging pretrial publicity were significantly more likely to find defendants 
guilty than were participants exposed to more neutral pretrial pUblicity or controls 
(Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorente, 1999). These effects were 
stronger when jury-eligible rather than student samples, real rather than simulated 
case information, and longer delays rather than immediate exposure to pretrial 
publicity and subsequent testing were used. Additionally, defendants were judged 
more responsible as cumulative, negative pretrial information was experienced, 
such as when participants heard combined information regarding details of 
crimes, alleged confessions, and eyewitness testimony. In a separate review of 
experimental tests examining the ability of mock jurors to obey instructions to 
disregard pretrial publicity, findings suggested that participants exposed to alleged 
confessions through pretrial publicity were more likely to find defendants guilty 
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and responsible than were others exposed to infonnation regarding the seriousness 
of the crimes or of denials by the defendants (Padawer-Singer & Barton, 1975; 
Tans & Chaffee, 1966). Other researchers found stronger influential effects of 
pretrial publicity when evidence was pro-conviction rather than pro-defense 
(Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981) or when other trial evidence was weak 
(Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973), and found longer lasting effects for emotional 
rather than factual pretrial publicity (Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990). Attempts to 
mitigate the effects of pretrial publicity through voir dire questioning of jurors, 
judicial instructions to disregard evidence, delays in the beginnings of trials, 
presentation of contradictory trial evidence, and jury deliberations have generally 
been found to be ineffective (Studebaker & Penrod, 1997). Based on this 
research, it appears that effects of pretrial publicity on jurors' decisions regarding 
defendants are highly influential and damaging. 
In the current research, the way in which confession evidence was 
introduced to mock jurors was varied to evaluate whether jurors who were 
exposed to inadmissible confession evidence through the media would be able to 
disregard this evidence in their verdict decisions. Half of the experimental 
participants who encountered confession evidence read a scenario in which the 
confession was entered into trial testimony. The other half of the experimental 
participants read a scenario in which confession evidence was introduced to jurors 
during deliberations. In this scenario a juror shared a newspaper article with the 
other members of the jury. The article disclosed that the defendant had made a 
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confession prior to the trial, but this confession had been excluded from testimony 
because the defendant confessed during an interrogation in which officers 
neglected to read him his Miranda rights. 
Juror Characteristics and Confession Evidence 
Although inadmissible confession evidence has been shown to be 
incriminating, difficult to disregard, and more influential than other incriminating 
types of evidence on jurors' judgments, there is a great deal that is unknown about 
how and why jurors differentially respond to confession evidence in trials. In a 
review of the current state of research on confession evidence, Kassin (1997) 
raised the concern that the lack of research undertaken by psychologists into 
jurors' reactions to confessions and police interrogative techniques may have 
hindered opportunities for the empirical support of reforms to policies regarding 
confessions. For instance, although assessments of defendants' responsibilities for 
crimes were found to be punitive and conviction rates were significantly higher in 
the preceding studies when confessions were included in evidence, these findings 
do not suggest that all mock jurors who experienced confession evidence decided 
in these ways. Do some jurors respond in certain characteristically identifiable 
ways that might help in predicting whether, and in what situations, they might use 
confession evidence in their verdict decisions? Might different jurors make 
different decisions based on different types of confession evidence? The current 
research was designed to attempt to answer these and other questions that directly 
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pertain to future policy positions regarding jurors' reactions to confession 
evidence. 
Individual differences in jurors' reactions to confession evidence in trials 
could be attributable to differences in the attitudes and beliefs held by each juror 
as she or he enters into jury service. Jurors enter into trials with preexisting 
notions regarding justice, honesty, integrity, and beliefs about the appropriateness 
of certain behaviors. As human beings, jurors could fall prey to committing the 
fundamental attribution error in their evaluations of defendants' guilt and victims' 
responsibility for their victimization (Hewstone & Fincham, 1996). That is, while 
accounting for both personal and situational factors when evaluating their own 
behavior, jurors could mistakenly underestimate the situations surrounding 
charges against defendants and overestimate the influence of defendants' 
individual personalities on their behaviors and assume defendants are responsible 
for their alleged crimes when they are not. This error would be magnified if 
jurors exhibited certain characteristic, attitudinal tendencies that influenced their 
belief in and reliance on the indicative nature of confession evidence without 
regard to the situations in which these confessions were made. Three social 
attitudes relevant to the current research that could influence jurors' decisions of 
defendants' guilt are Belief in a Just World, New Authoritarianism, and Internal or 
External Locus of Control. 
Belief in a Just World could lead jurors to assume that defendants were 
culpable for the charges against them. Lerner's Just World Theory (1980) posited 
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that human beings have the need to feel the world is just and that good things 
happen to good people. Accordingly, if individuals expressed the belief that the 
world is just, they might be expected to believe only good things would happen to 
them if they exhibited "good" behavior by engaging in socially condoned ways. 
These persons with high beliefs in a just world would also be expected to assume 
that others who experienced negative life events or outcomes must have acted in 
"bad" ways that caused these events or outcomes to occur. Given the adverse 
social and personal consequences associated with being arrested for crimes, 
individuals who hold high beliefs in a just world could be expected to consider 
defendants as "bad" individuals who deserve punishment, especially if these 
defendants confessed to their alleged crimes. 
Previous research found that women who were" conviction-prone" scored 
higher on questions regarding their beliefs in a just world, whereas women who 
changed their verdicts scored lower on these questions (Moran & Comfort, 1982). 
However, when examining results of criminal mock trial scenarios of sexual 
assault or sexual harassment cases, female jurors who had low beliefs in a just 
world were found to denigrate the victim in order to maintain a personal sense of 
safety while females with high beliefs in a just world did not do so (Kleinke & 
Meyer, 1990; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995; Sinclair & Bourne, 1998). These 
researchers suggested females in these studies who had low beliefs in a just world 
appeared to understand that good people like themselves could be victimized and 
blamed victims or some aspects of victims' behaviors for their victimization. By 
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doing so, females with low beliefs in a just world who were unlike victims in the 
studies or who did not engage in behaviors engaged in by these victims could 
maintain their personal safety and feel less vulnerable. Males in these studies 
who held high beliefs in a just world found victims more responsible than did 
males with low beliefs in a just world. However, in a civil mock trial scenario 
neither males or females with high beliefs in a just world attributed blame to the 
rape victim for her victimization, but they did award very different dollar amounts 
for compensation of her pain and suffering (Foley & Pigott, 2000). Female jurors 
with high beliefs in a just world awarded the victim much more than did other 
females and males with low beliefs in a just world, while males with high beliefs 
in a just world awarded her significantly less than did the other jurors in the study. 
These varied findings across criminal and civil mock trials suggest that both male 
and female jurors who hold high beliefs in a just world act in ways that will 
restore their sense of justice in an unjust situation (Austin, Walster, & Utne, 1976; 
as cited in Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981; Foley & Pigott, 2000). In other 
situations, jurors who believe in the guilt of a defendant but who are instructed to 
disregard key evidence that appears to support their beliefs because of due process 
violations could conceivably use this evidence in their decisions to ensure justice 
is achieved (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). Damning evidence of confessions, 
regardless oftheir admissibility, could therefore indicate to jurors with high 
beliefs in a just world that the appropriate and just responses to situations in 
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which they find themselves are to accept the confessions as fact and find the 
respective confessors guilty of crimes charged. 
Lambert, Burroughs, & Nguyen (1999) hypothesized an interactive 
relationship between an individual's belief in ajust world and level of right-wing 
authoritarianism. These researchers suggested one's high belief in a just world 
serves as a buffer in that this belief relates to the individual's perception of herself 
as a "good" person who is free from chances of experiencing negative events. On 
the other hand, authoritarians have been hypothesized as individuals who perceive 
the world as threatening and therefore desire order and control to counter this 
threat. Overt expressions in response to this perceived threat are often exhibited 
as prejudiced responsiveness to outgroup members (Brown, 1996; Narby, Cutler 
& Moran, 1993). However, according to the buffering hypothesis, the fears of 
individuals who held high authoritarian beliefs regarding imminent threats from 
external sources would conceivably be buffered by their beliefs in a just world 
because they would have the expectation that their "good" behaviors would 
protect them from these perceived threats. 
Individuals high in authoritarianism, right-wing authoritarianism, and / or 
legal authoritarianism have been interchangeably described as behaviorally and 
morally rigid, and respectful of and submissive to powerful others who they feel 
deserve and command legitimate authority (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Narby, et aI., 1993). Given their underlying fear of 
imminent danger, those high in authoritarianism have been found to support the 
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use of extraordinary measures of social control and force by authority figures if 
these measures were used in their efforts to minimize threats within society 
(Narby, et aI., 1993; Walker, Rowe, & Quinsey, 1993). As jurors, individuals 
high in authoritarianism could be susceptible to influence by judges and police 
given their deference to authority, and they have been found to be pro-prosecution 
and prone to favor the death penalty more than non-authoritarians (Bray & Noble, 
1978; Horowitz, Willging, & Bordens, 1998). Although most researchers have 
reported that jurors high in authoritarianism are prone to convict defendants and 
impose longer sentences than do non-authoritarians (Adorno, et aI., 1950; Bray & 
Noble, 1978; Narby, et aI., 1993), a few have challenged this finding (Sue, Smith, 
& Pedroza, 1975). In a real-world test undertaken during the trial of O. J. 
Simpson to examine the validity of proposed characteristics of authoritarians, 
Chapdelaine and Griffin (1997) found individuals' increased levels of pro-
prosecution bias were associated with their increased belief in Simpson's guilt, in 
the fairness of his trial, and in the need for enhanced punishment for Simpson. 
Increased legal authoritarianism exhibited by these participants was associated 
with their increased belief in Simpson's behavior as running counter to legal 
standards of behavior. 
Based on these and other findings, in a meta-analysis examining 
hypothesized characteristics oflegal and classic authoritarians, Narby, Cutler, and 
Moran (1993) argued the tendency of high authoritarians to convict was strongest 
when actions of defendants' behaviors conflicted with conventionally accepted 
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behavior. These researchers suggested these mock jurors could have 
conceptualized defendants as outgroup members in cOUlirooms in which all other 
persons acted in roles that furthered the interests of society and exerted control 
over those who would break traditional rules of behavior. They hypothesized 
that, in the view of those high in authoritarianism, appropriate punishment for 
these defendants and other outgroup members who engage in non-traditional 
behaviors should be severely applied over extended periods of time to gain their 
compliance. In this vein, defendants who confess to breaking social rules could 
conceivably be severely ostracized by individuals high in authoritarianism. 
Finally, individual levels of internal and external spheres of control could 
also influence jurors' attributions towards defendants in decision-making. Rotter 
(1966; as cited by Gudjonsson, 1992) conceptualized internal and external locus 
(spheres) of control as generalized expectancies regarding the origin of behavioral 
reinforcement. Those persons with internal locus of control were thought to 
envision reinforcement from external sources as responses to and consequences of 
their own appropriate or inappropriate behaviors. Contrarily, individuals with 
external spheres of control were thought to identify the sources of their behavioral 
reinforcement as originating from somewhere external to themselves via more 
powerful, influential others or from chance. Levenson (1972; as cited by Chia, 
Moore, Lam, & Chuang, 1995) re-conceptualized the external component of locus 
of control as a combination of two components, Powerful Others and Chance, 
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which are independent components that correlate positively to each other but 
negatively to internal locus of control. 
Although research on locus of control has rarely examined its relation to 
the attributions of jurors, there has been a great deal of research undertaken 
regarding the relationship between locus of control and other types of behavior. 
Individuals who exhibit internal locus of control have been found to engage in 
reactive behaviors when external sources attempt to constrain their behaviors 
(Gudjonsson, 1992). These individuals have been known to resist the influences 
of others and to express confidence and power regarding their inner selves. Some 
studies have found gender differences in locus of control, with females 
characterized as externals more often than males (De Brabander & Boone, 1990) 
and with male externals characterized as more susceptible to suggestibility than 
female externals or female or male internals (Gudjonsson, 1992). However, other 
studies have found no sex differences in locus of control (Chia, et aI., 1995). 
Several studies have found relationships between locus of control and approval of 
academic and work-related dishonesty (Coleman & Mahaffey, 2000; Jones, 1997; 
Reiss & Mitra, 1998; Smith, Coates, & Deis, 1998), with individuals who 
exhibited internal locus of control as expressing more ethical attitudes and less 
approval for scholastic or work-related dishonesty than did individuals who 
exhibited external locus of control. Jones (1997) intriguingly related these 
findings to the conceptualization and characteristics of the Protestant Ethic. 
According to the ideals of Protestantism which originated in the middle and late 
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seventeenth century, those who value and engage in hard work, personal honesty 
and integrity, time maximization, and reinvestment of earnings in oneself and 
one's offspring will be rewarded by a just God for their perseverance in life after 
death. Underlying this ethic is the staunch reliance in personal honesty and 
responsibility for one's own actions and the consequential outcomes of those 
actions. Those who adhere to the values of the Protestant ethic could, by 
definition, be identified as exhibiting internal locus of control; Jones cited several 
studies that support this contention. It does not require a great leap in logic to 
hypothesize that individuals who exhibit internal locus of control would be likely 
to assume the honesty and personal integrity they value in themselves would also 
be valued by others as well. If this were the case, they would not expect an 
individual to confess for a crime unless that individual was issuing an honest 
statement of personal confession in the act of taking responsibility for the 
consequences of previous behavior. Those individuals who exhibit internal locus 
of control would therefore be likely to view a confession as indicative of the guilt 
of the confessor without regard to the situation in which the confession was made. 
Research Hypotheses 
The current research was designed to determine whether mock jurors 
make differential assessments of responsibility for a defendant who is accused of 
felony murder based on the inclusion or exclusion of confession evidence in 
testimony and the nature of coercion used in obtaining the confession. To 
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examine these questions, seven hypotheses were posited for analyses (see Table 
1 ). 
Table 1. 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 7 
Hypotheses 
Jurors would be more likely to find the defendant guilty 
and be more certain of their verdicts if: 
The defendant confessed 
Positive coercion (blaming the victim) was used during the 
defendant's interrogation 
The confession was disclosed during deliberations in the jury 
room via a newspaper article 
Participants held high Belief in a Just World 
Participants held high New Authoritarianism 
Participants exhibited Internal Spheres of Control 
Participants held low Belief in False Confession Evidence 
First, it was hypothesized that participants would be more likely to find 
the defendant guilty for the incident and be more certain of their verdicts if there 
were evidence that the defendant had confessed. This tendency to evaluate 
confession evidence as indicative of guilt was expected to occur regardless of 
whether coercion was used by police to obtain the confession, the type of coercion 
employed by the police if applicable, and how jurors were informed of the 
confession (through evidence or during deliberations). In contrast, it was 
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hypothesized that participants would be more likely to find the defendant innocent 
and be more certain of their verdicts if there was no evidence of a confession by 
the defendant presented in the scenario. 
As previously discussed, research suggests that mock jurors often weigh 
confession evidence as less indicative of guilt when officials have been implicated 
in the use of negative coercion or force to elicit a confession from an accused 
defendant. As such, it was hypothesized that participants who were exposed to 
conditions in which the defendant confessed would be more likely to find the 
defendant innocent and be more certain of their verdicts when the confession had 
been elicited with negative coercion involving baiting questions, verbal force and 
verbal abuse. In contrast, it was expected that participants who were exposed to 
conditions in which the confession had been elicited with positive coercion, 
involving providing an "excuse" of "blaming the victim" for the defendant's 
alleged behavior, would be more likely to find the defendant guilty and would be 
more certain of their verdicts. This tendency was expected to occur regardless of 
how the jurors were informed of the confession (through evidence or during 
deliberations) . 
It was also hypothesized that participants would be more likely to find the 
defendant guilty and be more certain of their verdicts if evidence of the 
defendant's confession was originally deemed inadmissible in pretrial 
deliberations but was later introduced to the jury through procedural error rather 
than being heard as admissible evidence during the trial. In the procedural error 
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condition, a juror brought a newspaper article regarding the crime into the jury 
room and exposed the other jurors to the inadmissible confession evidence. In 
contrast, it was expected that participants who heard the admissible confession 
during trial would be more likely to base their determinations of the defendant's 
guilt on the confession itself and on the type of coercion used, with participants 
who heard confessions elicited with negative coercion finding the defendant less 
guilty than when positive coercion was implicated. 
The Just World Scale (JWS) is based on Just World Theory and measures 
variations in individuals' beliefs that the world is just (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). 
Based on the theory, if the world were perceived as being just, individuals who 
were victimized would be considered responsible for this victimization, and 
individuals who were arrested and/or confessed for crimes would be considered 
guilty of committing those or some other crimes. As such, it was hypothesized 
that because of their beliefs that bad things happen to bad people, such as those 
who are arrested, participants who held high BJW would be more likely to find 
the defendant who confessed guilty and would be more certain of their verdicts. 
Alternatively, it was expected that participants who held low BJW would tend to 
believe that there could be circumstances in which a suspect could have confessed 
to a crime that he or she did not commit. Given this, participants who held low 
BJW were expected to consider all of the evidence, including evidence regarding 
a confession and allegations of coercion, before they made their determinations of 
the defendant's guilt. The type of coercion allegedly used in eliciting the 
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confession was expected to moderate the determinations by participants who held 
low BJW, with these participants finding defendants less guilty when negative, 
rather than positive, coercion was alleged. 
The New Authoritarianism Scale is a measure of authoritarianism based 
on current questions (Brink; as cited in Myers, 1993). It was hypothesized that 
participants high in Authoritarianism would be more likely to find the defendant 
guilty for the incident and would be more certain of their verdicts, while 
participants Low in Authoritarianism would be more likely to find the defendant 
innocent and less responsible. The type of coercion allegedly used in eliciting the 
confession was expected to moderate the determinations by participants low in 
Authoritarianism, with these participants finding defendants less guilty when 
negative, rather than positive, coercion was alleged. 
Paulhus' Spheres of Control is a three-part measure designed to assess 
one's expectancies of outcomes in certain situations, despite goals or motivation, 
in terms of personal efficacy, interpersonal control and/or sociopolitical control 
(Paulhus, 1983). High scores in each or all of these three subscales indicate 
internalized loci of control in these areas, while low scores in each or all of these 
areas indicate externalized loci of control in personal, interpersonal and/or 
sociopolitical realms. In other words, individuals with high (Internal) scores on 
any or all of the three subscales are assumed to believe that they have control over 
the events that shape their lives in personal, interpersonal and/or sociopolitical 
realms. As such, it was anticipated that participants with high (Internal) scores in 
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personal, interpersonal, and/or sociopolitical subscales would be expected to 
perceive confession evidence as freely offered and indicative of guilt and would 
be more likely to find the defendant guilty and be more certain of their verdicts. 
Alternatively, participants with low (External) scores in any or all of these 
subscales were expected to believe that there could have been circumstances out 
of the control of the defendant that enticed or forced him to confess for the crime 
and therefore were expected to be more likely to find the defendant innocent. The 
type of coercion allegedly used in eliciting the confession was expected to 
moderate the determinations by participants low (External) in either or all of the 
three subscales, with these participants finding the defendant less guilty when 
negative, rather than positive, coercion was alleged. 
The Revised Coffman Onus for Nullification: False Confession Evidence 
Salience Scale (CONFESS) was designed by the author to measure the strength of 
an individual's belief in the possibility that evidence of an alleged confession is 
not conclusive of a defendant's guilt. Specifically, low scores suggest a Low 
Belief in False Confession Evidence and a high belief in the indicative nature of 
confessions, indicating that these participants perceive that a confession to a crime 
is conclusive of guilt regardless of any later retraction or disconfirming evidence. 
In contrast, high scores indicate a high Belief in False Confession Evidence and a 
low belief in the indicative nature of confessions, indicating that these participants 
perceive there could be certain situations in which individuals could confess to 
crimes when they were not actually guilty. As such, it was hypothesized that 
Confession Coercion 28 
participants with high Beliefs in False Confession Evidence would be more likely 
to find the defendant innocent and would be more certain of their verdicts. The 
type of coercion allegedly used in eliciting the confession was expected to 
moderate the determinations by participants with high Beliefs in False Confession 
Evidence, with these participants finding defendants less guilty when negative, 
rather than positive, coercion was alleged. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred forty-eight female (69.6%) and 64 male (30.0%) psychology 
students at a mid-sized, southeastern university volunteered to pmiicipate by 
completing the questionnaires for the experiment as one option for obtaining 
course credit (one participant did not respond to the question of gender). The 
participants varied in age from 17 to 50 with a mean age of 21.3 years. Most 
participants were White (n = 173), although some were Black (n = 17), Hispanic 
(n = 5), Asian American (n = 5), Native American (n = 1), or other (n = 12). 
One hundred seventy-nine (84%) of the participants were single, 19 
(8.9%) were married, 8 (3.8%) were cohabitating, 5 (2.3%) were divorced, and 2 
(0.9%) were widowed. Most participants (n = 196) had no children, although 15 
had one or more children, and two did not provide a response to this question. 
One hundred eighty-eight (88.3%) of the participants were full-time students, and 
the remaining 25 (11.7%) were part-time students. Of these, 148 participants 
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(69.5%) were employed in full or, predominately, part-time positions, and 65 
(30.5%) were unemployed. Participants were also asked to identity their political 
party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Independent, Undecided, or Other) and 
political attitudes (liberal, slightly liberal, slightly conservative, or conservative) 
(see Table 2). 
Design 
The study was a 2 X 2 between subjects design with type of coercion 
(positive or negative) and judicial error (procedural error or no procedural error) 
as the independent variables. Predictor variables were Belief in a Just World 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1975), Belief in False Confession Evidence, New 
Authoritarianism (Brink; as cited by Myers, 1993), and Spheres of Control 
(Paulhus, 1983). Dependent measures were participants' first and second verdicts 
("innocent" or "guilty") and participants' certainty of their verdicts on a 6-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely certain) to 6 (not at all certain). 
Scenario 
Section One (read prior to the first verdict / certainty assessment). The 
scenario involved a transcript of an investigation of the apparent murder and 
robbery of a fashion model in her apartment by an employee of the extermination 
company contracted by her apartment complex (see Appendix A). Late in the 
evening of the apparent murder / robbery, several residents of other apartments in 
the same building in which the victim lived reported loud disturbances from 
within her apartment, prompting the apartment manager to investigate, and, after 
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Table 2. Demographic Information 
Variable N % of Total 
~ 213 100,0 
(I) 17-20 143 67.1 
(2) 21-25 47 22.1 
(3) 26-35 14 6,6 
(4) 36-45 5 2,3 
(5) 46-55 4 1.9 
2, Gender 212 99,5 (I missing) 
(I) Female 148 69,5 
(2) Male 64 30.2 
3, Education 213 100,0 
(I) Some High School I .5 
(2) High School Graduate 33 15,5 
(3) Some College 142 66,7 
(4) Junior / Community Coli Grad 31 14,6 
(5) College Graduate 6 2,8 
4, Political Attitudes 211 99.1 (2 missing) 
(I) Liberal 37 17.4 
(2) Slightly Liberal 60 28,2 
(3) Slightly Conservative 76 35,7 
(4) Conservative 38 17,8 
5, Political Pmn: Affiliation 212 99.5 (I missing) 
(1) Republican 77 36,2 
(2) Independent 25 11.7 
(3) Democrat 49 23,0 
(4) Undecided 58 27,2 
(5) Other 3 1.4 
6, Ethnicity 213 100,0 
(I) Afi'ican American 17 8,0 
(2) Asian American 5 2.3 
(3) White American 173 81.2 
(4) Hispanic 5 2.3 
(5) Native American I .5 
(6) Other 12 5,6 
7, Marital Status 213 100,0 
(1) Mm1'ied 19 8,9 
(2) Divorced 5 2.3 
(3) Single 179 84,0 
(4) Widowed 2 ,9 
(5) Cohabiting 8 3,8 
8, Number of Children 211 99.1 (2 missing) 
(1) 0 196 92,0 
(2) 1-4 15 7,1 
9, Emlllo;i1uent Status 213 100,0 
(I) Employed Full-Time 31 14,6 
(2) Employed Pmt-Time 117 54,9 
(3) Unemployed 65 30.5 
10, Student Status 213 100,0 
(I) Full-Time Student 188 88.3 
(2) Pmt-Time Student 25 11.7 
finding signs of forced entry, to contact the police. 
Witnesses described a man seen at the scene of the crime as appearing to 
be "Caucasian, about 5'6 to 5'9, of medium build, with shoulder length brown or 
black hair, and wearing dark clothing." A key witness reported that an 
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exterminator, described as "a Caucasian male in his late 20's of average height 
and with ShOli to shoulder length hair" had serviced both his and the victim's 
apartments two days before the murder / robbery. 
Based on this and other testimony, the suspect was interrogated by the 
police, and his apartment was searched. The extermination service employee 
admitted he was using a company van on the evening of the murder / robbery that 
corresponded to a description of a van ("white or light colored") used by a man 
leaving the complex within a few minutes of the murder / robbery. Although no 
evidence from the crime scene was found, there was a substantial amount of cash 
found in the suspect's home. This cash was a smaller amount than that missing 
from the victim's apartment. He was arrested and charged for the crime while 
maintaining his innocence. 
Section Two (read after first verdict / certainty / surveys). After 
participants made their initial judgments of verdicts and assessments oftheir 
certainty of these verdicts, participants were presented with one of five versions 
of section two of the scenario. 
In the control condition, the defendant maintained his innocence. He was 
read his Miranda rights, and he was arrested and charged for the murder / robbery. 
He then waived counsel, was unable to produce an alibi, and was questioned for 
several hours by detectives who stressed their certainty of his guilt. 
In conditions in which the type of coercion was manipulated, the 
defendant first experienced all events as listed in the control condition. Following 
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these events, in the negative coercion condition, the detectives told the defendant 
that he had been filmed by a convenience store video camera while examining a 
pocket watch with a long chain like one taken from the victim's apartment. In the 
positive coercion condition, the detectives attempted to mitigate the victim's death 
by suggesting that she was flirtatious and had "led him on and asked for it." Both 
conditions ended after several hours when the defendant broke down and 
confessed to the crime, but he later stated this was done to stop the questioning. 
In conditions in which the procedural error occurred jurors were informed 
of the defendant's alleged confession during deliberations when a juror brought a 
newspaper article regarding the case into the jury room. The article reported that 
all events described in the control condition had transpired with the exception that 
the defendant was not read his Miranda rights during the interrogation which 
lasted several hours nor was he allowed to waive counsel prior to his breaking 
down and confessing to the crime to stop the questioning. The confession had 
therefore been deemed inadmissible during pre-trial motions. 
Procedure 
Participants came to a conference room in groups of one to eight, were 
informed the study was regarding a criminal murder and robbery trial, and were 
asked to complete and sign an informed consent if they were interested in 
participating. Participants who chose to participate were then handed a packet of 
materials containing, in order: demographics questions, the first section of the 
scenario (same for all participants), the first verdict and first certainty assessment 
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fonn, the Spheres of Control scale, the New Authoritarianism scale, the Revised 
Coffinan Onus for Nullification: False Confession Evidence Salience Scale, the 
Just World Scale, the second section of the scenario (varied by condition), the 
second verdict and certainty assessment fonn, and questions regarding their 
verdicts. After receiving the materials, the participants were instructed to read 
and complete the demographics questions and then read the first section of the 
crime scenario. Following these tasks, participants were asked to read the written 
instructions at the top of each additional task and to follow those accordingly. 
They were asked to refrain from referring back to previous pages, including those 
on which the testimony was printed. Participants were given two hours to 
complete the study. 
Written instructions for the first verdict asked participants to indicate their 
verdicts (innocent or guilty) based on the evidence presented in the first section of 
the scenario. Participants were then asked to rate certainty oftheir verdicts on a 
6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely certain) to 6 (not at all certain). 
Following the completion of the verdict and certainty assessment, the 
questionnaires, and the reading ofthe second (manipulated) section of the 
scenario, participants were asked to provide re-assessments of their verdicts and 
their certainty as previously described. 
Measures 
Demographic Variables. All participants completed a brief demographic 
questionnaire that measured the following characteristics: age, gender, education, 
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political attitudes, political affiliation, ethnicity, marital status, number of 
children, employment status, and student status (see Appendix B). 
Just World Scale. The Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) was 
completed by all participants (see Appendix C). The Just World Scale (JWS) 
measures participants' beliefs that good things happen to good people and that 
people get what they deserve. Internal consistencies of .80 and .81 were reported 
for two student samples by the authors. Participants' responses to the 20 items are 
assessed on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater belief in ajust world. 
New Authoritarianism. The New Authoritarianism scale (Brink; as cited 
by Myers, 1993) was completed by all participants (see Appendix D). Items from 
the scale are designed with modern students in mind and reflect aspects of 
authoritarianism including submission, conventionalism, destruction, cynicism, 
power, toughness, superstition, stereotypy, distaste for introspection, tendency to 
project, aggression and sexual concerns. Normative information regarding the 
scale was unavailable. The New Authoritarianism scale (NA) measures 
participants' responses to 18 items on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores represent higher 
authoritarian beliefs based on contemporary questions. Reliability and internal 
consistency for this sample were assessed using Cronbach's Alpha (.68) and 
Gutman's Split Half (.70). 
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Spheres of Control. The Spheres of Control scale (Paulhus, 1983) was 
completed by all participants. The Spheres of Control scale (SOC) is composed 
of three subscales: the Personal Efficacy Scale, Interpersonal Control Scale, and 
Sociopolitical Control Scale (see Appendix E). Items in each subscale were 
detelmined through a series of factor analytic studies conducted by Paulhus from 
an original set of 90 items. Samples were pulled from university students and 
athletes for original survey construction and validation. Paulhus (1983) reported 
internal consistency of the subscales as .75 for the Personal Efficacy Scale, .77 for 
the Interpersonal Control Scale, and .81 for the Sociopolitical Control Scale and 
reported test-retest correlations at six months at above. 70 for the three subscales. 
Each subscale measures participants' responses to 10 items on a 6-point Likeli 
scale ranging from 1 (disagree) to 6 (agree). Higher scores indicate internal 
spheres of control. 
Revised Coffman Onus for Nullification: False Evidence Salience Scale 
(CONFESS). CONFESS was completed by all participants (see Appendix F). 
CONFESS was designed by this researcher to fulfill a graduate research methods 
assignment and was revised for use in the current research to examine the public 
perceptions and attitudes of jury eligible citizens regarding the influential nature 
of confession evidence. The scale measures participants' responses to 30 items on 
a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely true) to 6 (completely false). 
Higher scores indicate higher beliefs in false confession evidence, indicating that 
these participants perceive that there could be situations in which individuals 
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could confess to crimes when they were not in fact guilty. Alternatively, lower 
scores indicate lower beliefs in false confession evidence, indicating that these 
participants perceive that confessions made in regards to crimes are generally 
conclusive of guilt. Reliability, split-half, and test-retest analyses were run using 
revised CONFESS for a pre-tested sample of seventeen students who volunteered 
to participate in a psychology and law course at the university who were tested at 
the beginning of the term and then retested after five weeks (see Table 3). 
Reliability and internal consistency for the current sample were assessed using 
Cronbach's Alpha (.82) and Gutman's Split Half (.69). 
Table 3. Pre-test Sample Analyses for Revised CONFESS 
Reliability Coefficient - Scale Alpha 
Correlation Between Forms 
Guttman Split-half 
Equal-length Spearman-Brown 
Alpha for Part 1 
Alpha for Part 2 
N= 17 
Results 
Test 1 
.87 
.68 
.77 
.81 
.79 
.49 
Test 2 
.81 
.67 
.79 
.80 
.81 
.75 
A I-test was performed as a manipulation check with confession 
(confession / no confession) as the independent variable and the level of 
Combo 
.90 
.70 
.82 
.82 
.81 
.87 
agreement on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly 
disagree) with the statement "Jack Ashton confessed to the murder robbery" as the 
dependent variable. The results of the I-test indicated a significant effect 
(1 = -9.49, P < .001). Participants who read confession evidence (n = 171, M = 
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3.04) agreed more strongly that the defendant confessed than did those 
participants in the control group who did not read the confession evidence (n = 
42, M = 5.48). 
First and Second Verdicts 
Hypothesis One. A MANOV A was run with confession (confession or no 
confession) as the independent variable and decisions regarding the first and 
second verdicts as the dependent variables. A Hotelling's Trace evaluation 
indicated no evidence of a significant effect for confession (E (2, 207) = 1.72, P = 
.181 ). 
Hypotheses Two and Three. The data were split by confession 
(confession or no confession) in order to run the following analyses. Remaining 
results refer to participants exposed to the confession conditions. 
A MANOV A was run with type of procedural error (procedural error or 
no procedural error) and type of coercion (positive or negative) as independent 
variables and decisions regarding the first and second verdicts as the dependent 
variables. A Hotelling's Trace evaluation indicated no evidence of a significant 
main effect for type of procedural error (E (2, 163) = 0.24, P = .782) or for type of 
coercion (E (2, 163) = 0.29, P = .745). Additionally, there was no significant 
interaction between type of procedural error and type of coercion (E (2, 163) = 
.07, P = .935). 
Hypothesis Four Through Seven. Participants' scores for each of the four 
scales used as predictor variables were divided by median splits into highs and 
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lows to evaluate hypotheses four through seven. Reliability, split-half statistics, 
and correlation matrices were run on the four scales used in the study (see Tables 
4 & 5). 
Table 4. Scale Reliability and Split-Half Analyses 
Just World 
New Authoritarianism 
Spheres of Control 
CONFESS 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.47 
.68 
.82 
.82 
Table 5. Scale Correlations 
JW NA 
Just World 
Pearson .417* 
Significance .000 
New Authoritarianism 
Pearson .417* 
Significance .000 
Spheres of Control 
Pearson -.056 -.112 
Significance .417 .103 
CONFESS 
Pearson -.324* -.503* 
Significance .000 .000 
* Con-elation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
Guttman's Split-half 
.47 
.70 
.69 
.73 
SOC CONFESS 
-.056 -.324* 
.417 .000 
-.112 -.503* 
.103 .000 
-.064 
.354 
-.064 
.354 
A MANOV A was run with the levels of participants' Belief in a Just 
World as the predictor variable and decisions for participants' first and second 
verdicts as the dependent variables. A Hotelling's Trace evaluation indicated no 
significant main effect for the model for levels of participants' Belief in a Just 
World (E (1, 209) = 0.39, P = .675). 
A MAN OVA was run with the levels of participants' New 
Authoritarianism as the predictor variable and decisions for participants' first and 
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second verdicts as the dependent variables. A Hotelling's Trace evaluation 
indicated no significant main effect for the model for levels of participants' New 
Authoritarianism (E (1, 207) = 1.51, n = .223). 
A MANOV A was run with the levels of participants' Spheres of Control 
as the predictor variable and decisions for participants' first and second verdicts as 
the dependent variables. A Hotelling's Trace evaluation indicated no significant 
main effect for the model for levels of participants' Spheres of Control (E (1, 207) 
= 0.70, n = .496). 
A MANOV A was run with the levels of participants' Belief in False 
Confession Evidence as the predictor variable and decisions for participants' first 
and second verdicts as the dependent variables. A Hotelling's Trace evaluation 
indicated no significant main effect for the model for levels of participants' Belief 
in False Confession Evidence (E (1, 207) = 0.97, n = .379). 
Discussion 
Hwothesis One: Influence of Confession Evidence on Verdicts and Certainty 
Assessments 
Contrary to expectations, participants exposed to confession evidence 
were no more likely than participants exposed to no confession evidence to find 
the defendant guilty in their verdicts. The verdicts in the current study were in 
line with, but slightly lower than, other mock trial findings in which jurors' 
decisions regarding alleged confession evidence were evaluated. In prior studies, 
34% to 50% of mock jurors returned convictions after exposure to contested 
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confession evidence, with more participants returning convictions in cases with 
stronger evidence (Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). 
Overall, for the first verdict in the present study, prior to reading any confession 
evidence 66 (31 %) of the 212 participants indicated the defendant was guilty; of 
these, 48 (22.6%) were in conditions in which confessions were later entered, 
while 18 (8.4%) were in the control condition. After the manipulation, 70 
(33.2%) of the 211 participants who responded indicated the defendant was 
guilty; of these, 54 (25.6%) were in conditions in which they read about the 
confession, while 16 (7.6%) were in the control condition with no confession. 
The difference among the groups was not statistically significant. Additionally, 
participants exposed to confession evidence were not significantly more certain of 
their first or second verdicts than were participants in the control condition (see 
Tables 6 & 7). 
Hypothesis Two: Influence of Type of Coercion on Verdicts and Certainty 
Assessments 
Contrary to expectations, participants exposed to confessions elicited with 
positive coercion were no more likely to find the defendant guilty than were 
participants exposed to confessions elicited with negative coercion. In fact, of the 
70 participants who found the defendant guilty in their second verdicts, a slightly 
higher percentage of participants found the defendant guilty when negative 
(33.3%) rather than positive (30.6%) coercion was used in eliciting the 
confessions, but this difference was not significant. These findings conflict with 
the results of numerous prior studies which found mock jurors to be more likely to 
Table 6. Certaint~ of First Verdict 
Level of Certainty Confession 
N ~ 
1 - Completely Certain 4 2.35% 
2 25 14.70% 
3 41 24.12% 
4 58 34.12% 
5 31 18.23% 
6 - Not At All Certain 11 6.47% 
Table 7. Certaint~ of Second Verdict 
Level of Certainty 
1 - Completely Certain 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 - Not At All Celiain 
Confession 
N 
7 
35 
54 
40 
26 
8 
~ 
4.12% 
20.59% 
31.76% 
23.53% 
15.29% 
4.70% 
Confession Coercion 
No Confession 
N ~ 
1 2.38% 
4 9.52% 
13 30.95% 
15 35.71% 
8 19.05% 
1 2.38% 
No Confession 
N ~ 
1 2.38% 
8 19.05% 
12 28.57% 
14 33.33% 
5 11.90% 
2 4.76% 
find defendants guilty of and responsible for crimes when positive rather than 
41 
negative coercion was implicated in eliciting their alleged confessions (Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1980; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). 
Perhaps this difference between the current study and previous research was 
related to the strength of the alleged evidence in the negative coercion condition 
in the current research. In this condition, detectives adamantly asserted that the 
defendant had been filmed with objects found at the crime scene. In the positive 
coercion condition, the alleged evidence was more vaguely portrayed. It is 
possible that jurors decided there was not enough evidence to convict in the 
positive coercion conditions. It is also possible that participants could have 
blamed the victim for her victimization in the positive coercion conditions. The 
positive coercion scenarios implied that the victim's behavior led the defendant to 
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believe she was sexually interested in him only to have her reject his reciprocated 
interest. Jurors could have perceived this alleged rejection as mitigating the 
defendant's guilt. These latter conjectures could also explain the tendency of 
participants to be slightly more certain of their second verdicts when positive 
(60.5%) rather than negative (52.4%) coercion was implicated in eliciting the 
confessions. As with the verdicts, this difference was not significant. 
Hypothesis Three: Influence of Procedural Error on Verdicts and Certainty 
Assessments 
Contrary to expectations, participants exposed to conditions in which 
confession evidence was disclosed to jurors during jury deliberation were no more 
likely to find the defendant guilty than were participants exposed to the 
confession as it was presented in trial testimony. Eighty-six (40.7%) of the 211 
participants who provided second verdicts were exposed to the procedural error 
condition; ofthese, 28 (32.6%) found the defendant guilty. Ofthe 125 (59.2%) 
remaining participants who were exposed to conditions in which confession 
evidence was presented during the trial, 42 (33.6%) found the defendant guilty. 
A recent evaluation of the effects of pretrial publicity on jurors' decisions 
when jurors' suspicions have been raised could provide a plausible interpretation 
of the current findings (Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997). This research 
found that, while the negative effects of pretrial publicity and other types of 
inadmissible evidence were replicated in their findings, participants who became 
suspicious of the motives ofthe sources ofthis information were more likely to 
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disregard the pretrial publicity or inadmissible evidence. Perhaps the mock jurors 
in the current study were skeptical of the newspaper article detailing the alleged 
confession that was introduced during jury deliberations or of the motives of the 
juror who brought the article to the attention of the jury. If this were the case, 
these participants may have disregarded the confession evidence and instead made 
their decisions based on other facts of the case. Individual jurors' beliefs 
regarding the veracity of confession evidence in general could have also 
influenced their ability to disregard the confession evidence in the scenario. 
However, if participants in the current research were able to disregard the 
inadmissible confession evidence in the procedural error conditions, this tendency 
would run counter to findings from other studies in which jurors were unable to 
do so (Fischer & Fehr, 1985; Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Possible skepticism 
regarding the newspaper article or the intentions of the juror who introduced the 
article to other jurors could have influenced participants to disregard the 
confession evidence. This could account for the finding in the current research 
that participants exposed to conditions in which confession evidence was 
disclosed to jurors during jury deliberations were not significantly more likely to 
be certain oftheir second verdicts than were participants exposed to conditions in 
which the confession was entered during trial testimony (see Table 8). 
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Table 8. Certaint~ of Second Verdict - Procedural Error Conditions 
Level of Certainty Procedural Error No Procedural Error 
N % N % 
1 - Completely Certain 2 2.32% 6 4.76% 
2 25 29.07% 18 14.28% 
3 30 34.88% 36 28.57% 
4 15 17.44% 39 30.95% 
5 12 13.95% 19 15.08% 
6 - Not At All Certain 2 2.32% 8 6.35% 
H~potheses Four Through Seven: Influence of Scales on Verdicts and Certainty 
Assessments 
Contrary to expectations, participants' levels of Belief in a Just World, 
New Authoritarianism, Spheres of Control or Belief in False Confession Evidence 
were not directly predictive of participants' assessments of the defendant's guilt in 
the first or second verdicts. Also, participants'levels of Belief in a Just World, 
New Authoritarianism, Spheres of Control, or Belief in False Confession 
Evidence were not directly predictive of participants' assessments of the certainty 
of their first or second verdicts. These null results were unexpected. Participants 
in the study appeared to rely on a dispassionate review and interpretation of the 
facts in the case in making their verdict and certainty assessments despite 
exhibiting varied levels of Belief in a Just World, New Authoritarianism, Spheres 
of Control, and Belief in False Confession Evidence. A majority of the 
participants duplicated their initial verdicts in their second verdicts after hearing 
the confession evidence in the experimental conditions. Statistical analyses of 
these initial verdicts indicated that the hypothesized attitudes and / or 
expectancies measured by the scales failed to individually predict the participants' 
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first verdicts. However, a review of previous research findings examining similar 
scenarios in terms of participants' levels of Belief in a Just World and 
authoritarianism and their expectancies regarding the loci of behavioral 
reinforcement suggested these attitudes and expectations would influence their 
behaviors and responses in predictable ways. For instance, previous research 
found that women who were "conviction-prone" held high Belief in a Just World 
(Moran & Comfort, 1982), and individuals who held high authoritarian beliefs 
were found to be pro-prosecution (Bray & Noble, 1978; Horowitz, Willging, & 
Bordens, 1998). Additionally, individuals who held high authoritarian beliefs 
were more likely to convict defendants when their behavior was in conflict with 
socially accepted behavioral norms than were individuals who held low 
authoritarian beliefs (Narby, et aI., 1993). Similarly, individuals who exhibited 
Internal Spheres of Control were found to express more ethical attitudes 
(Coleman & Mahaffey, 2000) and to value personal honesty and integrity (Jones, 
1997), suggesting that these individuals would be more likely to hold defendants 
accountable for their inappropriate behaviors than would individuals who 
exhibited External Spheres of Control. However, these hypothesized patterns of 
responding were not observed in the current research. 
It is possible that the scenario chosen for the study could have influenced 
some participants' decisions regarding the defendant's guilt in directions that were 
not hypothesized but that, in hindsight, could have been anticipated based on 
previous findings that examined individuals' levels of Belief in a Just World. All 
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participants in the study read an uncontested trial transcript that described the 
condition of the victim's apartment when she was found and the testimony of four 
vague witnesses who observed a van and a suspicious man around the time ofthe 
crime. The victim was described as a fashion model, and the description of items 
found in her apartment included the fact that several framed photographs of her 
had been removed from the walls of the apartment and were thrown on the floor 
and that one of these photographs was missing from its frame. The victim also 
was described as someone who kept money in a safe in preparation for "frequent 
travel with short notice for photo shoots." She had been stabbed and had 
defensive wounds on her arms and hands and a bruise on her right cheekbone. As 
noted in the previous section, prior research found that, in general, individuals 
who held high Belief in a Just World were expected to hold defendants 
accountable for their inappropriate behavior and be more likely to find these 
defendants guilty than would individuals who held low Belief in a Just World. 
However, when gender was salient, as in criminal cases of sexual assault or 
sexual harassment, the opposite trend was found (Kleinke & Meyer, 1990; 
Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995; Sinclair & Bourne, 1998). In these studies, female 
participants who held low Belief in a Just World, and who viewed themselves as 
dissimilar to the respective victims, denigrated the victims in order to maintain 
their personal sense of safety. Additionally, males in these studies who held high 
Belief in a Just World found the victims to be more responsible for their 
victimization than did males who held low Belief in a Just World. Given the 
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salience of gender alluded to by the victim's employment in the current scenario, 
some participants could have formed their initial verdict decisions following the 
above patterns of responding and therefore would not have been significantly 
influenced by the subsequent introduction of the confession during the 
experimental conditions. 
A second possible explanation for the null findings in the current research 
could be that individuals have developed a more skeptical view of confession 
evidence and of other types of highly incriminating evidence. Recent reports of 
the release of numerous individuals who were originally convicted based on the 
presentation of confession and eyewitness testimony in trial but were 
subsequently exonerated through DNA testing could have raised jurors' awareness 
and could lead them to more skeptically consider this evidence in lieu of other 
evidence in cases in which they are involved (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996; 
Radelet, Bedau, & Putnam, 1992). However, this supposition is questionable 
based on findings of research conducted during this same time which found jurors 
unable to disregard inadmissible evidence of an alleged confession negatively 
coerced and involuntarily made by a defendant (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Other 
mock jurors were more likely to weigh confession evidence as negatively 
influential on their subsequent verdicts than eyewitness or character testimony 
(Kassin & Neumann, 1997). Jury-eligible participants were also found to be more 
likely than student participants to find defendants guilty when confronted with 
cumulative, negative pretrial information such ~s eyewitness and confession 
Confession Coercion 48 
evidence (Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorente, 1999). Based on these 
findings, it appears that even if potential jurors have become more suspicious of 
highly incriminating types of evidence such as confession evidence they are often 
unable to keep this evidence from negatively influencing their decisions regarding 
the guilt and accountability of defendants. 
Finally, it would be beneficial in future research to examine an interactive 
relationship between participants' attitudes and expectancies and their subsequent 
verdict decisions. Perhaps, as suggested in the buffering hypothesis offered by 
Lambert, Burroughs, and Nguyen (1999), some individuals' levels of Belief in a 
Just World serve as buffers to their high authoritarian views of the world as 
threatening. If these same individuals also exhibited internalized expectancies 
regarding the origins of behavioral reinforcement, these expectancies could act in 
concert with their high Belief in a Just World to influence their opinions regarding 
the responsibility of others for their own behavior and behavioral consequences. 
Future research should examine whether individuals' levels of Belief in a Just 
World, New Authoritarianism, Spheres of Control and Belief in False Confession 
Evidence interact in ways that are predictive of their decisions regarding the 
culpability of defendants. 
General Discussion 
The current research was designed to detennine whether mock jurors 
make differential assessments of the guilt or innocence of a defendant based on 
the inclusion or exclusion of confession evidence and the type of coercion used in 
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obtaining these confessions. This study was undertaken in order to address a void 
in the research to detennine whether jurors' behavioral reactions to confession 
evidence could be predicted. Hypotheses for the study addressed the effects of 
various factors on jurors' verdicts regarding defendants' guilt or innocence and 
their certainty of these verdicts: inclusion of confession evidence, the type of 
coercion used in obtaining confessions, the admissible or inadmissible 
presentation of confession evidence, and the influence of potential predictor 
variables. Predictor variables which were assessed included participants' Belief in 
a Just World, Spheres of Control, New Authoritarianism, and Belief in False 
Confession Evidence. Unfortunately, no main effects for the scales were found 
for participants' first or second verdicts or for their assessments of their certainty 
of these verdicts. 
Several limitations of the current research need to be addressed. First, 
although the research was designed with the intention of examining juror rather 
than jury behavior, it is important to note that prior research has examined 
whether individual juror bias may be eliminated through the jury deliberation 
process but has found inconclusive results (Kerr, Niedenneier, & Kaplan, 1999). 
Although some jurors may appear to change their opinions in response to 
persuasion by other jurors, it is unclear which jurors mayor may not be 
influenced by others' persuasive tactics. However, research similar to the current 
study regarding the decisions of individual jurors helps in identifying 
characteristics of potential jurors who mayor may not be susceptible to the 
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influence of other jurors or judicial authorities. This research is particularly 
important in light of the lack of research examining jurors' perceptions of 
confession evidence and of defendants who have allegedly confessed (Kassin, 
1997). Second, participants in the study were asked to indicate their judgments of 
the defendant as either "innocent" or "guilty." Although the use of this 
terminology lacks mundane realism, these verdicts were selected over the use of 
the legal terminology of" guilty" or "not guilty" in order to more subtly 
distinguish which jurors would be able to completely disregard confession 
evidence and find defendants "innocent" rather than considering them "not 
guilty." 
Third, pmiicipants were asked to assess the certainty of their first and 
second verdicts in order to provide a more stringent measure of their opinions 
regarding the defendant's guilt. If similar research is undertaken in the future, 
perhaps a separate Likert item should be added to assess participants' beliefs 
regarding the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime in question in 
order to further isolate their opinions regarding the defendant's guilt. This 
measure could better separate participants' opinions regarding the probability that 
the defendant had committed the crime in question from their opinions regarding 
the strength of the evidence and other situational factors related to the case. 
Fourth, in future research examining coerced confessions, it would be beneficial 
to include a comparison condition in which a defendant confesses freely without 
coercion in order to determine whether participants evaluate the culpability of 
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defendants who make non-coerced and coerced confessions differently. Fifth, the 
scenario for the current research was presented in written format and lacked 
experimental realism. Future analyses should include the presentation of verbally 
and visually presented testimony in order to enhance the experimental and 
mundane realism ofthe experimental manipulation. Finally, future research 
should examine whether individuals' attitudes and beliefs interact to influence 
their opinions regarding the culpability of defendants in ways that may be 
predictive of their future behavior. 
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Appendix A 
Scenario 
Section I (Read by All Participants and Heard Prior to First Verdict / Certainty Assessment) 
Today, you are being asked to assume the role of a juror in a criminal trial. Please read the following case 
scenario, carefully attending to the details of the case as you would if you were serving on an actual jury with 
other jurors for a criminal trial. This case involves a charge against Jack Ashton, a 36 year-old male from 
Harsdale, Florida, of Murder in the 1 st Degree committed during a felony robbery. 
Uncontested Trial Transcript: 
At 9:22 p.m. on March 24, 1999, officers responded to a 911 call from the apartment manager of the 
Mangrove Apartment Complex at 14427 Orange Way, Harsdale, Florida. When they arrived at the complex, 
the manager, Jeff Foster, infonned the officers that three separate apartment lessees in building H had 
reported a loud disturbance; this disturbance appeared to have originated from apartment H-293, leased by a 
fashion model named Rachel Smith. Residents reporting the disturbance resided in two apartments adjacent 
to apartment H-293 and one apartment below the apartment in question. Mr. Foster reported he proceeded to 
apartment H-293 to investigate the disturbance. As he approached the apartment from the rear of the first 
floor of the building, he stated he looked up and saw that the glass in the balcony sliding doors had been 
broken on one side. Foster reported he then proceeded to the front door of the apartment and found it was 
unlocked and partially opened. Fearing the responsible party(ies) might still be inside, Mr. Foster 
immediately placed the 911 call to the police and reported the incident. 
At 9:53 p.m., the responding officers approached and entered apartment H-293 leased by Rachel Smith. 
They found her apartment appeared to have been ransacked. Some furniture had been overturned and 
contents of the drawers in both the bureau and the desk in the living room had been emptied onto the floor. A 
glass jewelry display case was shattered with its remnants left on the mantle piece. Several framed 
photographs which later were detennined to be photographs of Ms. Smith appeared to have been removed 
from the walls of the living room and were also thrown on the floor. In addition, an empty frame and broken 
glass were found on a recliner in the room. The officers proceeded into the single bedroom of the apartment 
and found this room ransacked as well. Inside the bedroom, they also found the victim, Rachel Smith, lying 
face up beside the bed. While one officer called dispatch for emergency response, the second examined the 
victim for life signs but found none. 
A subsequent autopsy by the medical examiner suggested tharMs. Smith was stabbed in the ann and the 
chest; the stab to the chest punctured her left lung causing her to die of asphyxiation. Also, Ms. Smith 
appeared to have defensive wounds on her anns and hands and a bruise on the right cheekbone. 
While at the scene, the officers searched the bedroom and found an empty jewelry case lying on the floor 
beside Rachel Smith's bed. Later discussions with Ms. Smith's parents detennined a diamond tennis bracelet 
usually worn by her was missing from the apartment as well as an antique pocket watch with an etched 
caboose and a long gold chain given to her by her great-grandfather. The Smiths stated their daughter always 
kept this pocket watch displayed in the jewelry case found smashed in the living room. They also confinned 
Ms. Smith generally kept around $2,500 in the wall safe for frequent travel with short notice for photo shoots. 
Detectives assigned to the murder investigation interviewed the occupants of the three adjacent apartments 
who had reported the disturbance to Jeff Foster, the apartment manager. Jessica Lincoln, the lessee of the 
first floor apartment directly below Ms. Smith's, recalled observing a man walking quickly towards a light or 
white colored van through her front window within a few minutes after she heard the noises trom the 
apartment above. Ms. Lincoln described the man she saw as appearing to be Caucasian, of medium build, 
between 5' 5" and 5' 9" tall, with shoulder length brown or black hair, and wearing dark clothing. She did not 
see the man's face but assumed his gender by his walk and size. Steve and Helen Smart, the lessees of the 
apartment to the right of apartment H-293, reported hearing a male and female in a muffled argument a few 
minutes after hearing a crashing noise. The lessee of the apartment to the left of apartment H-293, Mark 
Baldwin, reportedly heard muffled noises from the apartment but did not specifically see or hear anyone 
because he was watching a loud action film at the tnne of the incident. However, Mr. Baldwin was able to 
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assist the detectives with one crucial fact: his apartment and Ms. Smith's apartment had been treated for bugs 
two days prior to the incident by the extennination company under contract by the complex. When asked by 
the officers to describe the service provider, Mr. Baldwin described the extenninator as a Caucasian male in 
his late 20's, average height, and short to shoulder length brown hair. 
Given the description of the extenninator supplied by Mr. Baldwin closely matched Ms. Lincoln's account of 
the alleged perpetrator, the detectives contacted the owners of the extennination company to determine the 
extenninator's name and address. While contacting the company, the detectives also determined vendors 
from the company drove white vans with the company's logo on the vans' right sides. 
The detectives contacted and interviewed the extenninator, Jack Ashton. During questioning, the detectives 
noted Mr. Ashton's appearance seemed to coincide with the general description given by the witnesses. He 
was Caucasian, about 5' 7 112", had medium brown collar-length hair, and had a medium build. AdditionaIly, 
Mr. Ashton was using one of the company vans on the evening of the incident. The detectives questioned 
Mr. Ashton about his activities on the night of the murder, and Mr. Ashton said he had been at home during 
the entire evening. 
Probable cause was established based on the evidence identified by the officers, and a search warrant was 
requested by the detectives and issued by ajudge in the county. A subsequent search ofMr. Ashton's home 
led to the discovery of $900 in cash in a jewelry case in his bedroom. However, neither the difference in the 
cash (approximately $1,600) nor the two pieces of jewelry was located in the suspect's home. When 
interviewed, Mr. Ashton denied owning a pocket watch and instead stated he always wore the wristwatch he 
was wearing during the intelview. He maintained he kept the money in his home in case of an emergency. 
Throughout his trial, Mr. Ashton insisted he was not guilty. 
Section 2 (Read after First Verdict. Certainty Assessment, and Completion of Surveys) 
Condition I: No Confession or Coercion / No Procedural Error (Control Condition) 
According to police records, Jack Ashton was arrested and charged with the I st degree murder of Rachel 
Smith. At the scene, detectives read him his Miranda rights and then transported him to the county jail for 
processing. After booking, the detectives asked Mr. Ashton ifhe would like to waive his right to counsel and 
talk to them about the incident; he agreed. At trial, Mr. Ashton testified the detectives questioned him 
extensively for several hours. He stated he informed the detectives he had been home alone during the crime 
and had no alibi. He reported that during this questioning the detectives stressed their certainty of his guilt. 
Mr. Ashton entered a plea of Not Guilty. When asked at trial whether he was guilty of the murder, Mr. 
Ashton testified he most certainly was not guilty. 
Condition 2: Confession and Negative Coercion / No Procedural Error: 
(maximization by "knowledge-bluff" via "baiting questions" -- provided emphasis for seriousness of charges) 
According to police records, Jack Ashton was arrested and charged with the 1st degree murder of Rachel 
Smith. At the scene, detectives read him his Miranda rights and then transported him to the county jail for 
processing. After booking, the detectives asked Mr. Ashton ifhe would like to waive his right to counsel and 
talk to them about the incident; he agreed. At trial, Mr. Ashton testified the detectives questioned him 
extensively for several hours. He reported that during this questioning the detectives stressed their certainty 
of his guilt. Ashton further testified: "They told me they had me dead to rights! They insisted I was filmed 
on a convenience store surveillance tape pulling the woman's pocket watch from my jacket pocket, checking 
the time, and then struggling with the chain while trying to put the watch back. I pleaded with them, saying 
this wasn't true; I insisted I wasn't guilty all during the questioning. However, after several hours, I felt there 
was no hope. I had been at home alone during the crime and had no alibi, and the detectives were adamant 
that they had me on videotape with the watch and were certain that I was guilty. I finaIly broke and 
confessed to the murder just to stop the questioning." 
Mr. Ashton entered a plea of Not Guilty. When asked at trial whether he was truly guilty of the murder, Mr. 
Ashton testified he most certainly was not guilty. 
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Condition 3: Confession and Positive Coercion / No Procedural Error 
(minimization by "blaming the victim" -- provided "excuse" for poor behavior for defendant) 
According to police records, Jack Ashton was atTested and charged with the I st degree murder of Rachel 
Smith. At the scene, detectives read him his Miranda rights and then transported him to the county jail for 
processing. After booking, the detectives asked Mr. Ashton if he would like to waive his right to counsel and 
talk to them about the incident; he agreed. At trial, Mr. Ashton testified the detectives questioned him 
extensively for several hours. He reported during this questioning the detectives stressed their certainty of his 
guilt. Ashton testified: "The detectives talked about how sexy and attractive Rachel Smith was. Then the 
tall detective said he had heard from another witness she was a tease who led' guys on by flirting but then 
brushed them off if they got interested. He told me, 'I bet she invited you over after seeing you working at 
her apartment that day and then tried to blow you off. That's what happened, right?' The other detective 
added, 'Shoot, you can tell what kind of woman she was. She had all those pictures of herself all over the 
apartment... she was flashing her wares all over the place. Man, I can understand how a guy could get 
frustrated if a woman did that to him ... " I pleaded with them, saying this wasn't true; I insisted I wasn't guilty 
all during the questioning. However, after several hours, I felt there was no hope. I had been at home alone 
during the crime and had no alibi, and the detectives were adamant that they were certain I was guilty. I 
finally broke and confessed to the murder just to stop the questioning." 
Mr. Ashton entered a plea of Not Guilty. When asked at trial whether he was truly guilty of the murder, Mr. 
Ashton testified he most certainly was not guilty. 
Condition 4: Confession and Negative Coercion / Procedural Error 
According to police records, after extensive questioning spanning several hours Jack Ashton was arrested and 
charged with the 1st degree murder of Rachel Smith. Mr. Ashton entered a plea of Not Guilty. 
Assume that the trial is over and you are now in the jury room with the other jurors. During deliberations 
regarding the responsibility of the defendant for the alleged crime, another juror circulates a newspaper 
article acquired the previous day. This article reported that after extensive questioning, Mr. Ashton had 
confessed to the murder of the victim. During this questioning the detectives stressed their certainty of his 
guilt. According to the article, Ashton testified: "They told me they had me dead to rights! They insisted I 
was filmed on a convenience store surveillance tape pulling the woman's pocket watch from my jacket 
pocket, checking the time, and then struggling with the chain while trying to put the watch back. I pleaded 
with them, saying this wasn't true; I insisted I wasn't guilty all during the questioning. However, after several 
hours, I felt there was no hope. I had been at home alone during the crime and had no alibi, and the 
detectives were adamant that they had me on videotape with the watch and were certain that I was guilty. I 
finally broke and confessed to the murder just to stop the questioning." When asked at trial whether he was 
truly guilty of the murder, it was reported Mr. Ashton testified he most certainly was not guilty. 
However, during pretrial motions, Mr. Ashton's attorney was able to demonstrate the officers failed to read 
him his Miranda rights and have him waive his right to counsel prior to questioning. Given this error on the 
part of the police, the defendant's confession was excluded for procedural error. Therefore, the alleged 
confession should not be considered as evidence as to Mr. Ashton's guilt or innocence in this incident and 
was not presented at the trial. 
Condition 5: Confession and Positive Coercion / Procedural Error 
According to police records, after extensive questioning spanning several hours Jack Ashton was arrested and 
charged with the I st degree murder of Rachel Smith. Mr. Ashton entered a plea of Not Guilty. 
Assume that the trial is over and you are now in the jury room with the other jurors. During deliberations 
regarding the responsibility of the defendant for the alleged crime, another juror circulates a newspaper 
article acquired the previous day. This article reported that after extensive questioning, Mr. Ashton had 
confessed to the murder of the victim. During this questioning the detectives stressed their certainty of his 
guilt. According to the article, Ashton testified: "The detectives talked about how sexy and attractive Rachel 
Smith was. Then the tall detective said he had heard from another witness the victim was a tease who led 
guys on by flirting but then brushed them off if they got interested. He told me, 'I bet she invited you over 
after seeing you working at her apartment that day and then tried to blow you off. That's what happened, 
right?' The other detective added, 'Shoot, you can tell what kind of woman she was. She had all those 
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pictures of herself all over the apartment... she was flashing her wares all over the place. Man, I can 
understand how a guy could get frustrated if a woman did that to him ... " I pleaded with them, saying this 
wasn't true; I insisted I wasn't guilty all during the questioning. However, after several hours, I felt there was 
no hopc. I had bccn at homc alonc during thc crimc and had no alibi, and the detectives were adamant that 
they had me on videotape with the watch and were certain that I was guilty. I finally broke and confessed to 
the murder just to stop the questioning." When asked at trial whether he was truly guilty of the murder, it 
was reported Mr. Ashton testified he most certainly was not guilty. 
However, during pretrial motions, Mr. Ashton's attorney was able to demonstrate the officers failed to read 
him his Miranda rights and have him waive his right to counsel prior to questioning. Given this error on the 
part of the police, the defendant's confession was excluded for procedural error. Therefore, the alleged 
confession should not be considered as evidence as to Mr. Ashton's guilt or innocence in this incident and 
was not presented at trial. 
AppendixB 
Demographic Questionnaire 
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Please answer the following questions by circling the numbers that c011'espond to your answer or filling in the blanks. 
1. Age 
2. 
3. 
Gender: 
(I) Female 
Education 
(2) Male 
(I) Some High School (2) High School Graduate (3) Some College 
4. 
5. 
(4) Junior / Community College Graduate (5) College Graduate 
(6) Advance Graduate Degree 
How would you describe your political attitudes? 
(I) Liberal (2) Slightly Liberal (3) Slightly Conservative 
What is yoU!' political party affiliation? 
(1) Republican (2) Independent (3) Democrat (4) Undecided 
6. Ethnic Background 
(I) African American(2) Asian American (3) White American 
(4) Hispanic (5) Native American (6) Other _____ _ 
7. 
(4) Conservative 
(5)Other __ 
Marital Status 
(I) Mm1'ied (2) Divorced (3) Single (4) Widowed (5) Cohabitating 
8. Number of Children 
9. Employment Status 
(I) Employed Full-Time (2) Employed Pmt-Time (3) Unemployed 
10. Are you a 
(I) Full-Time Student (2) Pmt-Time Student (3) Not a Student 
Appendix C 
Just World Scale 
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Survey instrument deleted, paper copy avaliable upon request.
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AppendixD 
New Authoritarianism Scale 
Survey instrument deleted, paper copy avaliable upon request.
AppendixE 
Spheres of Control 
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Survey instrument deleted, paper copy avaliable upon request.
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AppendixF 
Coffinan Onus for Nullification: False Confession 
Evidence Salience Scale (CONFESS) 
Please carefully read the following questions and indicate the response closest to your opinion. 
Completely True 6 5 4 3 2 Completely False 
I. 
_2. 
_3. 
_4. 
_5. 
_6. 
_7. 
_8. 
_9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
_17. 
18. 
19. 
_20. 
21. 
_22. 
_23. 
_24. 
25. 
_26. 
_27. 
_28. 
_29. 
_30. 
The police treat all suspects equally well. 
If someone lies, then he or she is feeling guilty of something. 
I would never say that I had done something when I had not done it. 
People who were convicted of crimes were guilty of them. 
There are times when it is appropriate not to tell the truth. 
If someone is innocent, you can tell by the person's body actions. 
Police officers can tell when a suspect is lying by watching the suspect's eyes. 
The police do not arrest innocent people. 
People who confess that they committed crimes are admitting their guilt. 
The judicial system in the United States operates fairly. 
If a person being tried is innocent, the jury will acquit her or him. 
People generally get what they deserve. 
If someone said he did something wrong but later was shown not to have done the deed, he or she 
must have been guilty of something. 
A good detective can tell if someone is telling the truth by how much the suspect blinks. 
In general, people who were arrested have done something wrong. 
A person would never say he or she committed a crime unless he or she did it. 
A mother will often lie to protect her child from arrest. 
Some people who were arrested were not guilty of anything. 
A man would say he killed his wife's rapist to keep her from being arrested for the crime. 
Police never arrest suspects unless they were sure the suspects were guilty. 
If a woman accused of killing her lover confessed but then said she was threatened into confessing 
by the police, she should be acquitted. 
If a detective focuses only on one suspect in an investigation, that suspect must be guilty. 
I always let my family members assume the blame for what they did wrong. 
The police never arrest the wrong person. 
If someone tells a lie about one thing, he or she will lie in other situations. 
People who confess that they committed crimes and then say they didn't do these crimes are just 
trying to get out of trouble. 
I would never be arrested unless I was guilty of something. 
If a man convicted of murder for which he confessed appealed his conviction based on inadequate 
counsel, he should be granted a new trial. 
It is OK to bend the truth to save someone's feelings. 
The police have appropriate training and skills to detect when a suspect is lying. 
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